The non-existent objects of belief

Abstract

When I know something, what is the object of my knowledge? For example, when I know that it is raining, what is the thing that I know? The contemporary response is to say that what I know is the proposition “that it is raining”. Propositions are also the objects of belief: when I believe that it is raining, it is the proposition “that it is raining” that I believe. I am a proponent of the more controversial view that the object of my knowledge is the rain itself. I am the subject, and the object is the rain. A problem for this more controversial view is how to make sense of the objects of failed knowledge – when I merely believe that it is raining, for example. The rain itself cannot be the object of my belief if it is not raining – so what can be? In this article I will try to defend my view from this pressing objection: I will argue that it is possible for non-existent objects to be the objects of belief.